Does the threat of border rejections prohibit exports from developing economies? We address the microeconomic impact of the risk of rejection for safety reasons at the European border for Chinese agri-food exporters. We combine information from the European Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed with firm level export data from China by product-destination over the period 2000-2011. We show that border rejections significantly amplify the turnover among firms at the extensive margin of trade. Rejections increase the exit of Chinese exporters and at the same time enhance the entry of new ones. Furthermore, this effect is stronger for small firms. Our results at the intensive margin highlight some concentration of Chinese exports among big and productive exporters.
Introduction
Trade liberalization has driven the average applied tariff for Chinese agri-food exports to the European Union (EU) down to as low as 13 per cent in 2007.
1 However, access to the European market remains difficult as individual exporters must meet regulatory standards, face procedural obstacles and enforcement. Non-tariff measures (NTMs) act as substantial barriers in the exporting decision because they increase the cost of ex-
porting.
2 This problem is magnified for agri-food products due to stringent sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regulations 3 in most developed markets. Exporters from developing countries -who often hold a comparative advantage in these products -are most likely to struggle in meeting stringent sanitary standards due to insufficient traceability, deficient storage, limited access to certification bodies, etc. (Essaji, 2008) . While European standards -often more restrictive than international ones -are not meant to discriminate against imported goods, exporters in poor countries may thus be priced out of exporting all together.
NTMs also introduce an element of uncertainty related to possible border rejections of shipments not complying with sanitary regulations (the majority of rejections concern adulteration or misbranding). If exporting firms are unable to meet the required restrictions with a high enough probability, strict regulation and controls act as a deterrent to trade. Developing exporters tend to be over-represented in sectors (seafood for example)
heavily affected by sanitary concerns and import refusals (Baylis et al., 2011) . While the cost of matching a standard is certain, being rejected at the importer's border is a risk faced by the exporter. The risk is shaped by the variance in the quality of exported products (which can be reduced by investments in quality or controls prior to shipment) and the intensity of controls at the border. The latter intensity is observable by the exporter, but likely endogenous to past rejections signalling a high variance in the quality of ex-1 Source: MAcMap-HS6 database (Guimbard et al., 2012) . 2 For example, fixed costs such as implementing standards and building up compliance capacities, and recurring costs of documentation for traceability and certification of quality inspections.
3 Sanitary risk refers to food-borne human illness and animal diseases, and phyto-sanitary to the risks of plant pests and disease transmissions. Standards are a legitimate instrument for health, safety and environmental policy. They however may act as a deterrent to trade if exporting firms are unable to meet the required restrictions.
ported products. This is where externalities among exporters of the same country/region may appear for a given category of product, as part of the cost of being rejected is borne by competitors of the same exporting country. A spell of rejections may ultimately lead to an outright ban of a product from a certain origin. 4 In some very specific cases, negative externalities induced by rejections may have a product dimension, rather than a product-country dimension, i.e. all exporters of the same product -whatever their origin -may be affected by a rejection. However, the examen of reasons explaining rejections used in this paper suggests that these cases are rather scarce. Most of rejections have a product-country dimension and are due to production methods and/or climatic conditions affecting a given country. All in all, border rejections afford incomparable information on NTMs: while details on the occurrence of regulations provide evidence on de jure NTMs, knowledge on rejections is shedding light on their de facto trade impact.
The uncertainty component of NTM-related barriers has surprisingly been mostly overlooked in the literature on NTMs. Two exceptions are Jaud et al. (2013) and Grundke and Moser (2014) . Grundke and Moser (2014) adopt the exporter perspective and consider to what extent refusals embed entry in the United States (US). Estimating a gravity equation for 93 imported product-categories to the US for the period 2002-2012, they show that the cost of these refusals (e.g. the cost of not complying with US standards)
is borne by developing countries. EU refusals are used as an instrument because they are expected to be exogenous to US demand. The reasoning of Grundke and Moser (2014) is in terms of demand for protection in the US and stricter enforcement of NTMs but does not explicitly mention uncertainty as a trade barrier. Jaud et al. (2013) adopt the importer perspective and consider aggregate flows at the product level, with no firm dimension.
Starting from the evidence of an increasing diversification of EU import sources in agrifood products, combined with a concentration on a limited number of exporting countries, they conclude that entrants start small, while incumbent exporters, who proved safe, grab most of the EU market shares. Although Jaud et al. (2013) do neither mention uncertainty in the import market, the mechanism they refer to is clearly linked to this (i.e. sanitary risk in the importing country).
We adopt a different perspective here: we consider the exporter side of the EU market and assess the microeconomic impact of the risk of rejection at the European border. We explicitly investigate the effects of such rejections on the export decisions of firms serving the EU market. Food sanitary standards have become an important policy concern in the EU 5 making this market particularly sensitive to the issue at stake. While access to the EU market has become easier following tariff reductions, exporters actually face strict food safety requirements that are often more restrictive than multilateral Codex ones.
Enforcing SPS measures is difficult, especially for firms from developing countries. Most imports of foodstuffs have passed through multiple middlemen before they reach supermarket shelves. This makes it extremely difficult to trace their origins. While, regulatory agencies only conduct spot checks, inspections are not random. Certain firms, countries or products may be under special focus. Exporters thus face considerable uncertainty about the likelihood and costs involved in exporting. The exporting country we choose is China, a large and diversified developing economy having repeatedly faced problems in rich import markets for food stuff exports. In a nutshell, Chinese exporters might well be spotted by controls. Interestingly we have information on individual exports of the universe of Chinese firms exporting to the EU, at the product level. Although we cannot identify which individual exporter has been rejected, we have information on the concerned product, the origin (China) of the product and the year of rejection. Accordingly, studying the effect of standards that Chinese agri-food exporters must satisfy on the European market is an original approach.
Against this background our contribution is threefold: Firstly, we add to a growing empirical literature examining the impact of restrictive NTMs' at the firm-level and using information on de facto NTMs (see for example Fontagné et al., 2015 , for a combination of these two dimensions). While not all NTMs are barriers, border rejections are cases where regulations are actually enforced, raising an obstacle to trade. Micro-data at the firm-level allows studying the effect of these rejections on firms' participation to the export market (extensive margin) as well as adjustments in exported value (intensive margin). Further, this paper pays explicit attention to the role of firm heterogeneity. Theory suggests that large and more productive firms are likely to react differently to NTMs than small ones.
Secondly, we are to the best of our knowledge, the first paper to look at the effect of SPS measures on firm-level exports from a large and significant developing economy. Our data covers the universe of Chinese agri-food exports over more than a decade (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) and includes HS6 product and destination information. Since its accession to the WTO in 2001, China's impressive trade growth has further accelerated. China is arguably the most dynamic and important economy and exporter. At the same time, anecdotes suggest that Chinese agri-food exporters are struggling to meet sanitary standards.
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Thirdly, we focus on a specific trade-impeding indicator of SPS regulations using a dataset of rejections at the European border rarely mobilized. Disdier et al. (2008) . All this literature is indeed confronted to a dilemma:
either using indirect evidence on border protection in a gravity perspective with the risk of capturing much more than NTMs, or using direct -de jure -evidence on the presence of NTMs (notifications at the WTO) with the risk of outdated and incomplete data. 9 But more importantly, two issues must be taken seriously. First, not all NTMs are barriers which casts doubt on the validity of systematic assessment of their trade reducing impact;
second not all exporters are evenly affected which suggests to look at the micro impact of these measures. Hence the need to rely on individual firm response to measures identified as obstacles stressed by Fontagné et al. (2015) . We embrace the latter approach in the following, combining information on rejections with Chinese export data at the firm level.
Such combination authorizes exploring the impact of NTMs in terms of uncertainty on individual exports.
9 See Chen and Novy (2012) on the distinction between direct and indirect approaches.
Uncertainty and export flows
Most of the large (and old) literature addressing the impact of uncertainty on exports is about exchange rate uncertainty (see e.g. Hooper and Kohlhagen, 1978) and initially concluded to a limited impact on aggregate trade volumes. Focusing on developing economies exports, the conclusion is more nuanced (Caballero and Corbo, 1989; Grobar, 1993) . But this broad picture may hinder an uneven impact among firms. An application to China using micro data is Héricourt and Poncet (2015) . The negative impact of real exchange rate volatility on firm-level export performance is magnified when exporters are located in provinces with low financial development.
Uncertainty on trade costs has been addressed from two point of views. Firstly, from the point of view of the exporting country. Deficiency of infrastructures (Nordås and Piermartini, 2004) or simply red tape generate uncertainty on the delivery date and possibly quality of the delivered batch, which is indeed an obstacle to trade. Using information on internal transport costs for a sub-sample of 24 Sub-Saharan countries Freund and Rocha (2011) show that inland transit time uncertainty reduces export values.
An extra-day of time uncertainty -defined as the maximum and the average number of days it takes for an exporter to complete exporting procedures -induces a 13 % reduction in export values. Building on an argument about uncertainty related to water in the tariffs raised by Francois and Martin (2004) and using an heterogeneous firms model, Handley (2014) shows that trade policy uncertainty is delaying entry of exporters into new markets.
The argument is that in presence of sunk entry costs in export markets, uncertainty about future tariffs is creating a real option value of waiting. Binding tariffs is reducing such uncertainty. Osnago et al. (2015) illustrate these effects of trade policy uncertainty at the product level, considering the margins of exports of 149 countries. A one percent reduction in the difference between bound and applied tariffs is shown to increase exports by one percent, controlling for the level of tariffs. Feng et al. (2014) focus on China and measure the uneven impact of uncertainty on heterogeneous exporters. Using firm-product data and considering the US market in the years surrounding China's WTO accession, they
show that reduction in tariff uncertainty induces reallocation of export across Chinese firms. Entries and exits are boosted, to the very benefit of exporters providing higher quality products at lower prices.
Secondly, uncertainty is also a trade impediment on the importing country side of the transaction. The starting point here is the quality (or safety) of the product, which is not observable. For experience goods, reputation is coming from repeated imports of safe goods from a given origin. The important issue is whether the consumer/importer can identify precisely the identity of the exporter. The classical case in the Industrial Organization literature is when the consumer knows the identity of the producer (Shapiro, 1983) . The case where exporter's identity is unknown is more challenging, and particularly adapted to commercial relationships with developing countries. In such a case, quality expectations on a product sold by a given firm is possible by the record of quality problems (in our case: border rejections) of the exporting country as a whole. In such case, individual exporters suffer from problems encountered by other exporters of the same good from the same country. In an international context, these information externalities can be accommodated -or magnified -by minimum quality standards or origin labeling (Falvey, 1989) . As information externalities are not internalized by the individual exporters, the quality provided by a large country with many firms tends to be low, leading to a collective reputation problem. McQuade et al. (2012) provide a theory pointing to such effects and argue that it fits well the Chinese case.
Data and descriptive statistics
This section first describes our two main data sources. We then provide some descriptive statistics.
Data
We combine information on rejections of agri-food shipments at the European border with firm level export data from China. This allows us to measure the impact of uncertainty from sanitary riskiness and regulations on firms' export decisions. Although we cannot identify which individual exporter has been rejected, we have annual information on the concerned product and the origin (China) of the product.
Food alerts and border rejections
The Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF), 10 created in 1979, consists in a cross-border information exchange system about emergency sanitary measures among the European Economic Area (EEA, i.e. EU27 countries plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway). RASFF members must notify the European Commission about any serious health risk deriving from food or feed. All notifications starting from 1979 are publicly available through the RASFF portal.
For the construction of our dataset, we recorded all notifications by RASFF member states over the period 1979-2012 and made several assumptions:
• First, we treat the RASFF border as the relevant location of observing notifications and consider all notifications by RASFF members regarding non-RASFF countries.
We ignore notifications concerning products originating in other RASFF countries.
• Over our sample period, two rounds of RASFF membership enlargements occurred and we account for them. The list of RASFF members is reported in Table 1 .
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• Since we are concerned about rejections due to SPS concerns, we restrict our analysis to agri-food products, i.e. products belonging to chapters 01-24 of the HS classification.
• Some shipments may be first rejected but after some improvements -for example in the product labeling -may be allowed to enter the RASFF market. On the other hand, other shipments are never allowed to enter the RASFF market. Since we are interested in de facto restrictive rejections, we limit our analysis to this second group of shipments. Using information provided on the RASFF portal for each notification, we are able to identify if future entry is allowed or not and keep only observations related to permanent import refusals.
• If an alert specified two origin countries we split the observation into two: one for each origin.
After all these cleanings, we obtain a total of 14,860 notifications for the period 2000-2011, of which 1,690 deal with Chinese shipments.
The RASFF portal contains information on products only in verbal form. We coded the notification data to the HS 4-digit level -the most disaggregated level at which we can identify notifications. A detailed description of the applied methodology is provided in Appendix A.1. Using this approach, we were able to match 89% of all alerts with an HS4 code (13,241 out of 14,860), and 91% of Chinese alerts (1,537 out of 1,690).
Insert Table 1 here
Chinese exports at the firm-level
Chinese custom data 13 report information on exports by firm-product (6-digit of the HS classification)-destination and year. Our dataset covers the period 2000-2011. Custom data which contain the universe of Chinese exports are of course preferable to surveys used elsewhere in the literature as they avoid issues of stratification or sampling such as selection effects.
In our empirical analysis, we restrict our attention to non-wholesalers. While intermediaries play an important role in trade, we want to focus on active firm decisions.
Intermediaries may display different export behaviours and may find it easier to react to border rejections.
We aggregate all exports by firm-destination-year at the HS4 level (the level to which we code border rejections). One issue could be that some firms may export different HS6
12 More precisely for the period 2008-2012, we use information on border rejections, which is explicitly reported on the RASFF portal and refers to consignments that have failed to enter the RASFF market and that are not allowed to enter through another border post. Before 2008, this information on border rejections is not explicitly available. We therefore exploit information on notifications and on the action taken by RASFF authorities (e.g. import not authorized; product destruction; product placed under customs seals; destruction or return after official permission; re-export to a third market; containers detained) to identify import refusals. 13 We thank Sandra Poncet for providing us with the data products within one HS4 sector. To address this concern, we verify that the large majority of HS4-firm observations also uniquely identify an HS6 shipment. This is indeed the case.
Even for multi-HS4 product firms, around 70% of HS4 sectors contains only a single HS6 product. (see Table A .2 in the Appendix A.2). to the RASFF market are mono-product firms. On average, firms export 1.6 product to the RASFF market (the median is equal to one). We investigate the trade impact of RASFF border rejections on Chinese firms. As discussed above, border inspections and possible rejections create some uncertainty and impact exports. Furthermore, this impact is likely to be heterogeneous across exporters.
Descriptive statistics
First, no all shipments are inspected and inspections are not random. Certain firms or products, presenting higher safety risks, are often under special focus. Second, some exporters, especially the biggest and most productive ones, are more able to invest in the quality of their products or in controls prior to shipment and then can reduce their risk of rejections.
Even though the RASFF data do not allow identifying directly the shipment and exporting firm hit by a rejection, we can estimate the effect of rejections on all exporters of a hit product. Our empirical analysis aims to estimate exporter behaviors at the extensive and intensive margins of trade as a function of rejection measures and their joint effect with firm characteristics. We follow the empirical strategy suggested by Fontagné et al. (2015) and estimate this equation:
where i refers to firm, s to HS4-digit product category, and t to year.
As previously mentioned, the RASFF border is the relevant location for our study.
Since RASFF countries exchange information on rejections, one product rejected at one RASFF border will not be able to enter the RASFF market at another border. Therefore, we do not consider export flows to each RASFF country separately, but only aggregated exports to all RASFF countries. Thus, the RASFF market as the whole is the only destination in our analysis.
We use three different dependent variables, y i,s,t :
• A dummy for exit = 1 if the firm exports the HS4 product to the RASFF market in t−1 but not in t (0 otherwise). The counterfactual are firms that export a given HS4
to RASFF countries in t − 1 and also in t. We disregard re-entry in later periods;
• A dummy for entry = 1 if the firm exports the HS4 product to the RASFF market in t but not in t − 1 (0 otherwise). Here, the counterfactual are firms that do not enter the market, i.e. do not export a given HS4 to RASFF countries in t − 1 and in t.
Variables entry and exit capture the (firm-HS4) extensive margin of trade. They are not analogous. As highlighted by the counterfactual, exit is conditional on the firm being active in t − 1, while entry is conditional on not exporting in t − 1.
• The value of the export flows for the intensive margin. Specifically, the value exported by the firm to the RASFF market for a given HS4 product in year t. We focus on incumbents (i.e. surviving firms, e.g. firms that were already present in t − 1 and continue to export in year t. In other words, we do not consider firms that start to export in year t.)
Our set of explanatory variables includes border rejections and firm characteristics.
We consider two different measures for border rejections. As suggested by Essaji (2008) , we use lagged rejections as internal instruments (i.e. before actual exports in t). Our rejection measures (rejection s,t−1 ) are:
• A dummy for past rejection = 1 if at least one shipment from China of that HS4
product was rejected at the RASFF border in t − 1 (0 otherwise);
• The cumulated number of past rejections from China for that HS4 product. This cumulated number is simply computed as the sum of Chinese shipments of that HS4
product that were rejected in the past until year t − 1.
As highlighted in the trade literature (Melitz, 2003) , firms' export performances are heterogeneous and largely driven by their productivity. Unfortunately, Chinese custom data do not provide details on firms' characteristics (e.g. productivity, employment, total sales, etc.). Thus, to control for firm heterogeneity and its impact on export performance, we relate to the size of firms, defined as the log of their total agri-food exports in t − 1 (ln(size) i,t−1 ). As shown in the literature (Mayer and Ottaviano, 2008) , export values are a good proxy for the overall size of firms and big exporters are usually more efficient and more productive. For ease of interpretation, firm size is centered around the median size of all firms in that year.
Furthermore, to capture some heterogeneous effects in the impact of rejections across firms, we interact our rejection variables (dummy and cumulated number) with the size of the firm.
Finally, we include fixed effects in our estimations to control for unobserved heterogeneity. We follow Fontagné et al. (2015) and introduce HS2 sector-time (φ HS2,t ) and firm (µ i ) fixed effects. These fixed effects respectively control for business cycles and importdemand shocks at the sector level and for time-invariant characteristics specific to a firm such as productivity or average size.
We do not cluster our standard errors. Our main variable of interest is the interaction term between rejections and firm size. This variable varies at the firm-HS4-year level, and so we do not need clusters.
15
We estimate all equations by OLS. The extensive margin dependent variables are dichotomous in nature. However, we prefer the linear probability model (LPM) to nonlinear models such as logit or probit, as it avoids the incidental parameter problem in face of the large number of fixed effects we employ. Furthermore, OLS allows simple interpretation of sample average marginal effects.
Throughout we exclude wholesalers from our estimations. As previously mentioned, we want to focus on active firm decisions. However, we conduct a series of robustness checks with wholesalers and main conclusions remain unchanged (cf. infra).
15 Standard errors are clustered in one robustness check (cf. infra) and our results are unchanged.
We first study whether rejections of Chinese shipments affect Chinese exports to the RASFF market. The analysis is performed both at the extensive and intensive margins of trade. We then test the robustness of our results. Table 3 presents the impact of Chinese rejections on the exit of Chinese firms from the RASFF market. In columns (1) and (2), rejections are simply measured with a dummy set to one if at least one shipment of the same HS4 was rejected in t − 1. We investigate exit in year t. In column (3), we include the cumulated number of past rejections of Chinese shipments for that HS4 over time until t − 1. All columns control for firm size.
Extensive margin of trade
Furthermore, columns (2) and (3) include an interaction term between firm size and past rejections. Results suggest that past rejections increase the probability of exit of Chinese firms from the RASFF market, once we control for the heterogeneity in the impact of rejections across firms. Besides, exit affects more small and less productive firms than big firms, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term between firm size and rejections being negative. In line with the large literature on firm-level exports, we also find that -everything else equal, i.e. independently of past border rejections -small firms tend to exit more.
Insert Table 3 here Table 4 reports the impact of Chinese rejections on the entry of Chinese firms into the RASFF market. Estimations include the same explanatory variables as in Table 3 .
We find that rejections tend to favor the entry of new firms. The estimated coefficients on both rejection measures (dummy and cumulated number) are indeed positive and significant (p < 0.01). Furthermore, it appears that rejections promote more the entry of small firms than of big firms, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term between firm size and rejections being negative and significant (p < 0.01). Finally, independently of past rejections, big and productive firms enter more into the RASFF market than small ones. Tables 3 and 4 reveals that the impact of past rejections is much stronger on firm exit than on firm entry. R 2 are also significantly lower in Table 4 .
Interestingly the comparison of estimated coefficients in
All in all, our results are in line with Jaud et al. (2013) , who find that product sanitary risk increases diversification of European imports at the extensive margin. Here, we observe turnover among Chinese firms exporting to the RASFF market. Past rejections increase the exit of Chinese exporters and at the same time enhance the entry of new ones, and the effect both on exit and entry is stronger for small firms.
Insert Table 4 here
Intensive margin of trade
Next we focus on the intensive margin of trade (Table 5 ). We first look at the value exported by incumbent firms (i.e. firms present in years t − 1 and t) to the RASFF market (columns (1)-(3)). Our results highlight three main facts. First and independently of border rejections, bigger firms tend to survive and increase their exports to the RASFF market (firm size variable is significant, with p < 0.01). Second, on average firms that continue exporting products hit by rejections do not increase, nor decrease their exports to the RASFF market. The two variables (dummy and cumulated number of past rejections) have no significant impact on the export value in columns (2) and (3). Third, some heterogeneity is however observable across firms, and results on the interaction terms between past rejections and firm size suggest that big and more productive incumbent firms increase their exports to the RASFF market in the year(s) following the rejections.
Therefore, large firms do benefit from the exit of small exporters consecutive to rejections.
Column (4) investigates the impact of border rejections on the quantity exported by incumbents, while column (5) examines the price -measured by the unit value -of products exported by these firms. The heterogeneous effect of past rejections across firms is still positive but less significant (p < 0.05 for quantity and p < 0.10 for price). In terms of magnitude the effect on price is smaller than the one on quantity. Finally independently of past rejections, the size of the firm has no impact on price. These results suggest that big and productive incumbent firms increase the quantity exported to the RASFF market, as well as the product price to a lesser extent.
Our results at the intensive margin show some concentration of Chinese exports among big and productive exporters. This effect is stronger for products hit by past rejections.
These results confirm Jaud et al. (2013) , who also highlight concentration at the intensive margin, especially for risky products. When rejections are more frequent and cumulate, European importers concentrate their orders on large and plausibly more reliable Chinese exporters, who increase their exports to the RASFF market.
Insert Table 5 here
To conclude on the global impact of rejections on exports of Chinese firms to the RASFF market, we observe a double-movement: some turnover among firms at the extensive margin of trade and some concentration effect at the intensive one.
Robustness checks
We now investigate the robustness of our results to alternative specifications and samples.
All these tests are performed using our preferred estimations, i.e. the ones including the cumulated number of past rejections as a measure of border rejections and the interaction term between this rejection measure and the firm size. Three estimations are run in each case: one on the probability for Chinese firms to exit the RASFF market, one on the probability of entry into that market, and one on the intensive margin of trade.
We first test whether our results are changed when standard errors are clustered.
As mentioned in section 4, these clusters are not mandatory here because our variable of interest (i.e. the interaction term between rejections and firm size) varies at the firm-HS4-year level. However as a robustness check, columns (1)-(3) of Table 6 include clusters defined at the HS4-year level. Results are not affected by their inclusion.
A second source of potential bias relates to churning flows and potential reverse causality. To do so, we introduce in the estimation a measure of the mean length of HS4 flows exported to the RASFF market (columns (4)-(6) of Table 6 ). This variable has a significant influence on both the extensive and intensive trade margins, but its inclusion does not affect our previous conclusions.
Insert Table 6 here Endogeneity may also come from our focus on Chinese rejections and exports of Chinese firms. The potential bias is reduced by the use of lagged rejections. However below, we replicate our main estimations using two alternative sets of rejections: i) non-Chinese rejections, ii) all rejections whatever the origin of the products. Table 7 reports the results.
For the extensive margin of trade, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients is lower but they still have the same sign and level of significance as in Tables 3 and 4 . At the intensive margin of trade, we observe two slight changes. First, the estimated coefficient on the cumulated number of past rejections becomes significant, suggesting that past rejections boost exports of incumbent firms. Second, the heterogeneous effect of past rejections on small vs. big and productive firms disappears, the estimated coefficient on the interaction terms being not significant (at the intensive margin only). All in all despite these changes, we still observe the double-movement of diversification at the extensive margin of trade and concentration at the intensive one due to past rejections.
Insert Table 7 here
In Table 8 , we control for product (unobservable) characteristics, which are not fully captured by our current explanatory variables or fixed effects. To check the sensitivity of our results to this potential bias, we add an HS4 fixed effect in the estimations. Table 8 presents the results. At the extensive margin of trade, previous conclusions remain unchanged. At the intensive one, the estimated coefficient on the border rejection variable is now negative and significant (p < 0.01), suggesting that firms export less in HS4
products hit by rejections once we control for unobserved characteristics. Even for big firms the effect is negative, the sum of the coefficients on the cumulated number of past rejections and on the interaction term being negative. Furthermore, our results suggest that negative externalities induced by border rejections mainly have a product-country dimension (i.e. exporters of the same product and the same origin country -rather than exporters from other countries -are affected by rejections). If all exporters -whatever their origin -were affected by rejections, then rejection effects would have been captured by the HS4 fixed effects.
Insert Table 8 here
We next test whether our results are sensitive to the sample of firms considered in the estimations. We first exclude firms that are exporting to the RASFF market only for a short period. To do so, we compute the number of years of presence of each Chinese firm exporting to the RASFF market. We then restrict our sample to firms for which the number of years of presence is above the median. The first three columns of Table 9 present the results. This sample restriction has no impact on our previous conclusions.
The three last columns of Table 9 add wholesalers to our sample of firms. Until now, we restricted our analysis to non-wholesalers in order to examine active firm export decisions.
However, wholesalers represent a non-negligible number of Chinese exporters. In fact, their inclusion in the sample has almost no impact on the estimated coefficients and previous findings are still valid.
Insert Table 9 here Firms exporting to other OECD markets (i.e. Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, South Korea, and the US) may be more able to pass successfully RASFF inspections. Other OECD markets also impose drastic safety regulations and conduct inspections. Therefore, firms exporting to these markets are more likely to sell safe products and to have a higher productivity which may help them to deal with inspections and their related costs and uncertainty. Table 10 distinguishes between firms exporting to at least one OECD market (other than the RASFF market) in t − 1 vs. other firms and investigates whether rejections have different trade effects on these two groups of firms.
We first observe that previous conclusions -diversification at the extensive margin and concentration at the intensive one -are accurate for both groups of firms. However, some differences can be noted in the magnitude of the estimated coefficients. Exit from the RASFF market due to border rejections is less likely to happen for firms already exporting to another OECD market in t − 1. Furthermore, this effect is magnified for big and productive firms (columns (1) and (2)). Besides, entry on the RASFF market induced by rejections is also slightly stronger for firms already exporting to at least one other OECD market (columns (3) and (4)). At the intensive trade margin, productive incumbent firms exporting to OECD markets in t − 1 are also more likely to increase their exports to the RASFF market in t compared to other firms (columns (5) and (6)).
Insert Table 10 here
Concluding Remarks
We study the impact of the threat of rejections on exports from developing economies.
Chinese exporters of agri-food products are more likely to exit the European market if the product they export was hit by rejections in previous years. At the same time, rejections favor the entry of new firms. We therefore highlight some diversification effect at the extensive margin of trade. At the intensive margin, border rejections boost exports of incumbent firms, suggesting some concentration effect. Furthermore, the microeconomic impact of the risk of rejection is heterogeneous across firms.
Our results fit in with the large literature on firm heterogeneity and trade. We provide a more nuanced understanding of the impact of de facto restrictive regulations on exporting firms. Furthermore given the importance of food safety and importers' emphasis on sourcing from reliable producers, our results suggest that policy makers and law enforcers should adopt a comprehensive approach and pay attention to individual firms while focusing on whole sectors. 
A Appendix

A.1 Matching RASFF alerts with HS4 product codes
One contribution of our paper is the method developed to assign product codes to the verbal descriptions provided for the notifications on the RASFF portal. This allows us to further match these notifications with export data and measure the impact of sanitary riskiness and regulations on trade.
For the assignment of a product code to each notification, we use information on product category (for example "alcoholic beverages") and subject (e.g. "undeclared sulphite in Wine from Chile") reported by RASFF authorities. We assign observations to the HS classification in which our Chinese firm-level data are coded. We code to the HS 4-digit level -the most disaggregated level at which we can identify notifications. We use the 2002 revision of the HS classification.
A manual assignment of HS4 codes on an individual basis is not possible given the number of notifications in our database (14,860 observations for the period 2000-2011 after all cleanings described in Section 3). Therefore, to assign the product codes, we implement the following approach. We first split subject in order to extract the relevant information on the product (e.g. "wine"). Next, we rearrange some product categories and align them more directly with HS2 sectors (e.g. "fish and fish products" and "farmed fish and products thereof -other than crustaceans and mollusks" are combined). We also undertake some re-assignments of observations across product categories to ensure consistency. Finally, we disregard observations from product category "food contact materials"
as we are only interested in agri-food products (HS chapters 01-24).
Then, we identify the sector (HS2) wherever possible, and assign the HS4 product code using Stata's regexm function. Regexm searches for keywords associated with a specific HS4 code. For example, within product "fish", "frozen hake fillets" can be assigned HS4 code 0304 ("Fish fillets and other fish meat -whether or not minced, fresh, chilled or frozen") using keywords "fillets" and "frozen". By the same method "chilled hake" is assigned HS4 code 0302 ("Fish, fresh or chilled, excluding fish fillets and other fish meat of heading No 0304"). The full Stata do files with the matching correspondence and code mapping RASFF notifications and HS codes are available on request from the authors.
Using this strategy, we successfully match 89% of alerts with an HS4 code (13,241 out of 14,860). Among border rejections of China we match 91% (1,537 out of 1,690).
The incidence of rejection is fairly heterogeneous across products, but clustered in some sectors. Our notifications are split over 115 different HS4 codes out of potentially 201 in the 24 chapters of agri-food products (for China we identify 67 different HS4 products).
If we look at all rejections, the majority of notifications concerns HS08 "Edible fruits and nuts", HS03 "Fish and Crustaceans, Molluscs", and HS12 "oil seeds and oleaginous fruits". For China, HS12 and HS03 are the two main chapters affected by border rejections.
We conduct an additional eye-ball check of the mapping in Our methodology present several advantages. Firstly, it can easily be checked, verified and replicated and ensures consistent treatment of RASFF observations. Secondly, it can be extended to more data at very low costs. For example, it can easily be applied to additional observations as more RASFF notifications become available over time. Thus at the HS4 level, we may observe large firms to be less likely to exit the RASFF market.
A.2 Chinese firm-level exports
To address this issue, we record the number of HS6 products exported by a firm within each HS4 sector. Table A .2 summarizes the results. Columns (1) to (5) report the fractions of firm-HS4 exports that have the underlying number of HS6 products. We can observe that firms -even multi-HS4 firms -usually export only one HS6 product within each HS4 sector. 78.23% of firms present in only one HS4 sector export just one HS6 product within that HS4 sector (and 15.49% of these firms export two HS6 products within that HS4 sector). At the other side of the spectrum, for firms present in 10 or more HS4 sectors, only one HS6 product per HS4 sector is exported in 65.61% of the cases (and 2 products in 19.31% of the cases). 
